

A Tractable and Expressive Class of Marginal Contribution Nets and Its Applications

Edith Elkind*¹, Leslie Ann Goldberg², Paul W. Goldberg², and Michael Wooldridge²

¹ Nanyang Technological University, Singapore and University of Southampton, United Kingdom

² Department of Computer Science, University of Liverpool, U.K.

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Coalitional games raise a number of important questions from the point of view of computer science, key among them being how to represent such games compactly, and how to efficiently compute solution concepts assuming such representations. *Marginal contribution nets* (MC-nets), introduced by Ieong and Shoham, are one of the simplest and most influential representation schemes for coalitional games. MC-nets are a rule-based formalism, in which rules take the form *pattern* \rightarrow *value*, where “*pattern*” is a Boolean condition over agents, and “*value*” is a numeric value. Ieong and Shoham showed that, for a class of what we will call “basic” MC-nets, where patterns are constrained to be a conjunction of literals, marginal contribution nets permit the easy computation of solution concepts such as the Shapley value. However, there are very natural classes of coalitional games that require an exponential number of such basic MC-net rules. We present *read-once MC-nets*, a new class of MC-nets that is provably more compact than basic MC-nets, while retaining the attractive computational properties of basic MC-nets. We show how the techniques we develop for read-once MC-nets can be applied to other domains, in particular, computing solution concepts in network flow games on series-parallel networks.

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1 Introduction

Coalitional games raise a number of important questions from the point of view of computer science, key among them being how to represent such games compactly, and how to efficiently compute solution concepts assuming such compact representations. The aim is typically to develop a representation that is compact for cases of interest, and yet allows the efficient computation of solution concepts. Accordingly, a number of compact representation schemes for coalitional games have been proposed, with various computational properties. For example, Deng and Papadimitriou [1] consider a representation of coalitional games based on weighted graphs: nodes in a graph correspond to players, and to compute the value of a particular coalition C , one computes the total weight of the sub-graph induced by C . The representation is compact because the size of a game represented in this way is at most quadratic in the number of players. Deng and Papadimitriou showed that for this representation, computing the Shapley value, one of the key solution concepts in coalitional games, is computationally easy. However, the weighted subgraph representation is not *complete*, in that there are some coalitional games which simply cannot be represented using this approach. An obvious research question is therefore to consider how to generalise the approach of [1] as far as possible, without losing its desirable properties. One of the simplest and most influential such generalisations is the *marginal contribution nets* (MC-nets) scheme of Ieong and Shoham [2]. MC-nets are a rule-based formalism, in which rules take the form *pattern* \rightarrow *value*, where “*pattern*” is a Boolean condition over agents, and “*value*” is a numeric value. Ieong and Shoham showed that, for a class of what we will call “basic” MC-nets, where patterns are constrained to be a conjunction of literals, marginal contribution nets permit the easy computation of solution concepts such as the Shapley value. A number of researchers have built on the Ieong and Shoham model of marginal contribution nets, for example, considering

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* Corresponding author: e-mail: ee@ecs.soton.ac.uk

the application of marginal contribution nets to non-transferable utility games [3, 4]. In separate, but closely related work, the use of “weighted formulae” representations, essentially identical to marginal contribution nets, have been studied in the context of representing utility functions and capturing preference relations [5].

Given this interest in the use of marginal contribution nets and related formalisms, it is very natural to consider the extent to which the basic formalism of Ieong and Shoham can be extended and enriched, while retaining the attractive computational properties they established. In particular, there are very natural classes of coalitional games that require an exponential number of “basic” MC-net rules, and while it is easy to define more compact generalisations of MC-nets, the most obvious such extensions lose the attractive tractability properties of basic MC-nets. The following two questions therefore suggest themselves: (i) Is it possible to extend basic MC-nets, to allow compact representation of those cases where basic MC-nets fail, while retaining the desirable computational properties of basic MC-nets? (ii) As we generalise basic MC-nets, at what point does the representation cross the threshold from tractable to intractable? It is to these two questions—and in particular the first—that we address ourselves in this paper. Our main contributions are as follows.

First, we show that the obvious generalisation of basic MC-nets leads to intractability with respect to computing the Shapley value. We then present a simple and intuitive generalisation of basic MC-nets called *read-once* MC-nets. We show that read-once MC-nets are exponentially more compact than basic MC-nets, in that there exists a very natural class of coalitional games that can be represented compactly using read-once MC-nets, but which would require an exponential number of basic MC-net rules. We then prove that read-once MC-nets retain the desirable computational properties of basic MC-nets: in particular, it is possible to compute in polynomial time the Shapley values of players in a game represented as a read-once MC-net. We then demonstrate that our approach has wider applicability. We show that our algorithm for the Shapley value on read-once MC-nets yields a pseudopolynomial time algorithm for computing the Shapley value in network flow games on series-parallel networks, which were introduced in the context of multi-agent systems in [6]. Moreover, this algorithm can also be used to compute Banzhaf power index in such games. We begin, in the following section, by recalling the basic framework of coalitional games and MC-nets.

2 Preliminaries and Notation

In this section, we define the basic concepts in coalitional game theory that are used throughout the remainder of the paper; see, e.g., [7] for more detail.

2.1 Coalitional Games

A *coalitional game* $G = (I, v)$ is given by a set of *agents* $I = \{x_1, \dots, x_n\}$, $|I| = n$, and a *characteristic function* $v : 2^I \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ that maps any subset (coalition) of the agents to a real value. This value is the total utility these agents can guarantee to themselves when working together. To simplify notation, we will sometimes write i instead of x_i .

A coalitional game is *monotone* if for any $S \subset T \subseteq I$ we have $v(S) \leq v(T)$. A monotone game is *simple* if v can only take values 0 and 1, i.e., $v : 2^I \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$. In such games, we say that a coalition $C \subseteq I$ *wins* if $v(C) = 1$, and *loses* if $v(C) = 0$. An agent i is *critical*, or *pivotal*, to a winning coalition C if the agent’s removal from that coalition would make it a losing coalition: $v(C) = 1$, $v(C \setminus \{i\}) = 0$.

2.2 The Shapley Value

The Shapley value of an agent captures his marginal contribution to possible coalitions. Let Π be the set of all permutations (orderings) of n agents. Each $\pi \in \Pi$ is a one-to-one mapping from $\{1, \dots, n\}$ to $\{1, \dots, n\}$. Denote by $S_\pi(i)$ the set of all predecessors of agent i in π , i.e., $S_\pi(i) = \{j \mid \pi(j) < \pi(i)\}$. The Shapley value of the i th agent in a game $G = (I, v)$ is denoted by $\phi_G(i)$ and is given by the following expression:

$$\phi_G(i) = \frac{1}{n!} \sum_{\pi \in \Pi} [v(S_\pi(i) \cup \{i\}) - v(S_\pi(i))]. \quad (1)$$

We will sometimes omit the index G if it is clear from the context. We will say that an agent i is pivotal for a permutation π if it is pivotal for the coalition $S_\pi(i) \cup \{i\}$.

For simple games, the formula (1) counts the fraction of all orderings of the agents in which agent i is critical for the coalition formed by his predecessors and himself. It thus reflects the assumption that when forming a coalition, any *ordering* of the agents entering the coalition has an equal probability of occurring, and expresses the probability that agent i is critical. In general, the Shapley value can be viewed as an agent's expected marginal contribution to the value of a coalition, under the probability model described above.

The Shapley value is the only payoff division scheme that satisfies the following natural axioms:

Efficiency: It fully distributes the total payoff available to the agents:

$$\sum_{i=1}^n \phi_G(i) = v(I).$$

Symmetry: If agents i and j are interchangeable, i.e., for any $S \subseteq I \setminus \{i, j\}$ we have $v(S \cup \{i\}) = v(S \cup \{j\})$, then $\phi_G(i) = \phi_G(j)$.

Dummy: If an agent i does not contribute to any coalition, i.e., $v(S) = v(S \cup \{i\})$ for any $S \subseteq I \setminus \{i\}$, then $\phi_G(i) = 0$.

Additivity: For any two coalitional games $G = (I, v)$ and $G' = (I, v')$ defined over the same set of agents I , for the coalitional game $G + G'$ given by $(G + G') = (I, v + v')$ we have

$$\phi_{G+G'}(i) = \phi_G(i) + \phi_{G'}(i).$$

2.3 Banzhaf Power Index

The Banzhaf power index was originally defined in the context of weighted voting games [8]. However, it can be used to measure an agent's power in any coalitional game. Similarly to the Shapley value, it reflects the agent's expected marginal contribution to the value of a coalition. However, the underlying probabilistic model of coalition formation is different: rather than assuming that the agents join the coalition in random order and thus all permutations of the agents are equally likely, it assigns equal probability to all 2^n possible coalitions. Formally, the Banzhaf share $\beta_G(i)$ of an agent i in a game G is computed as follows:

$$\beta_G(i) = \frac{1}{2^{n-1}} \sum_{S: i \notin S} [v(S \cup \{i\}) - v(S)]. \quad (2)$$

While Banzhaf power index satisfies the symmetry axiom and the dummy axiom, it may violate the efficiency axiom as well as the additivity axiom.

3 Marginal Contribution Nets

In this section, we define marginal contribution networks (MC-nets), summarise previous results on computing various solution concepts for a restricted subclass of MC-nets, and show how to extend these results to a larger class of MC-nets. We also discuss the limitations of our approach, showing that in the most general setting the problem becomes NP-hard.

3.1 Previous Work

Marginal contribution networks (MC-nets) were proposed by Jeong and Shoham [2] in 2005. MC-nets provide a flexible and fully expressive representation scheme, which describes a coalitional game using a set of rules. In more detail, a *marginal contribution network* is given by a set of agents $I = \{x_1, \dots, x_n\}$ and a finite collection of *rules* of the form $(P \rightarrow V)$, where $V \in \mathbb{R}$ is the *value* of the rule, and P , which is a Boolean expression over the set I , is the *pattern* of the rule. A set $S \subseteq I$ of agents is said to *meet the requirements* of a given pattern P (denoted by $S \models P$) if P evaluates to `true` when the values of all Boolean variables that correspond to agents

in S are set to `true`, and the values of all Boolean variables that correspond to agents in $I \setminus S$ are set to `false`. The value $v(S)$ of a group of agents S is defined to be the sum over the values of all rules that apply to it, i.e.,

$$v(S) = \sum_{P \rightarrow V: S \models P} V.$$

While the definition of MC-nets proposed by Jeong and Shoham [2] is quite general, the computational results for Shapley value in [2] are limited to a special case of this representation, namely, the setting where the patterns in all rules are required to be conjunctions of literals, i.e., expressions of the form

$$x_{i_1} \wedge \cdots \wedge x_{i_k} \wedge \bar{x}_{j_1} \wedge \cdots \wedge \bar{x}_{j_l}.$$

In the rest of the paper, we call such rules *basic*, and say that an MC-net is *basic* if it only uses basic rules. In [2], the authors show (Proposition 1, [2]) that even this restricted class of marginal contribution networks is universal, i.e., can be used to represent *any* coalitional game (perhaps using an exponential number of rules). Moreover, they show that this representation is at least as succinct as some other well-known representation languages, such as multi-issue representation [9] or graphical form representation [1], and in some cases can be exponentially more succinct. Finally, [2] provides a polynomial-time algorithm for computing the Shapley value in basic MC-nets.

Paper [2] also discusses the complexity of the core (another important solution concept in coalitional games) for games represented as MC-nets. In more detail, in [2] the authors show that the problem of determining whether a given payoff vector is in the core is coNP-complete, and deciding core non-emptiness is coNP-hard; these results hold even for basic MC-nets. On the positive side, the authors provide a polynomial time algorithm for these problems in the special case where the *graphical representation* of the MC-nets has bounded treewidth (however, the MC-net does not have to be basic). Subsequently, Malizia et al [3] answer the open question of [2] by showing that deciding core non-emptiness is in coNP. Taken together, these results suggest that for core-related questions the types of rules that appear in the MC-net (basic rules vs. general rules) do not influence the computational complexity. Hence, in what follows we will not discuss the core and core-related problems.

3.2 Limitations of Basic MC-Nets

In basic MC-nets, the formulas used in the rules are required to be conjunctions of literals. For example, $x_1 \wedge \bar{x}_2 \rightarrow V$ is a rule that can appear in a basic MC-net. However, when using coalitional games to describe multi-agent systems, in addition to explicitly listing the agents whose presence/absence is necessary for completing a task, one may want to express the fact that some of the agents are substitutes for a particular task. A natural way to represent this would be by using disjunction (i.e., the \vee connective). For instance, suppose that a certain task can be completed by a team that includes agent x_1 and one of the agents x_2 and x_3 (e.g., because x_2 and x_3 have identical skills, but x_1 has a unique set of skills different from that of x_2 and x_3). This information can be represented by a rule of the form

$$(x_1 \wedge (x_2 \vee x_3)) \rightarrow V, \tag{3}$$

where V is the value of this task. However, $x_1 \wedge (x_2 \vee x_3)$ is not a conjunction of literals and hence (3) is not a basic rule.

To overcome this difficulty, in [2], the authors show how to represent any coalitional game using basic rules. Indeed, if we want to describe a coalitional game that corresponds to (3), we can do so using two basic rules, namely, $x_1 \wedge x_2 \rightarrow V$ and $x_1 \wedge x_3 \wedge \bar{x}_2 \rightarrow V$. However, in some cases such transformation may lead to a superpolynomial blow-up in the representation size, at least if we restrict the values associated with rules to be non-negative. Consider the following example.

Example 3.1 Consider a set of $2n$ agents, each of which has exactly one skill. Suppose that there are n skills in all, and that agents $2i$ and $2i - 1$ have the i 'th skill. Suppose that there is a task of value $V > 0$ that can be completed using all n skills. If we allow disjunctions in rules, then this situation may naturally be represented by the following rule:

$$(x_1 \vee x_2) \wedge \cdots \wedge (x_{2n-1} \vee x_{2n}) \rightarrow V. \tag{4}$$

However, we will now show that to replace this rule with a collection of basic rules with non-negative values, we will need a superpolynomial number of rules.

Theorem 3.2 *In Example 3.1, one needs $\Omega(2^n)$ basic rules with non-negative values¹ to represent the game given by (4).*

Proof. Consider a collection of basic rules that represent the game given by rule (3). We can assume that each rule in this collection is satisfiable. Observe that for all i in $\{1, \dots, n\}$, every basic rule in the collection must contain a non-empty subset of $\{x_{2i}, x_{2i-1}\}$. Indeed, if that is not the case for some i , consider the set R of rules that do not contain those literals, where $R \neq \emptyset$. If we put $x_{2i} = x_{2i-1} = \text{false}$, rules in R should be satisfied by some values of the remaining Boolean variables, and should give associated positive values to the coalition satisfying them. That is a contradiction, since the total value should be 0 if $x_{2i} = x_{2i-1} = \text{false}$.

Define a *minimum satisfying assignment* (MSA) to be a satisfying assignment where for each pair $\{x_{2i}, x_{2i-1}\}$, only one of x_{2i}, x_{2i-1} is set to `true`. There are 2^n MSAs. We claim that if σ and τ are distinct MSAs then the set of basic rules satisfied by σ does not intersect the set of basic rules satisfied by τ . This implies that there are at least 2^n basic rules. To establish the claim, note that there is some i such that one of σ and τ has $x_{2i} = \text{true}$ and the other has $x_{2i-1} = \text{true}$. All rules satisfied by the MSA with $x_{2i} = \text{true}$ must contain the literal x_{2i} —this is due to the observation that at least one of $\{x_{2i}, x_{2i-1}\}$ must be present, and the literal x_{2i-1} would not be satisfied. However, those rules cannot be satisfied by the other MSA. \square

Moreover, it turns out that even if we do not restrict the values to be non-negative, there are natural coalitional games that cannot be compactly represented by basic MC-nets. The following theorem gives an example of such a game. (We will see later that it can be compactly represented by a read-once MC-net.)

Theorem 3.3 *Consider a game $G = (I, v)$, $I = \{1, \dots, n\}$, described by the MC-net $H = [I, 1 \oplus \dots \oplus n \rightarrow 1]$ where $n \geq 2$. To represent G as a basic MC-net, one needs $\Omega((3/2)^{n/2})$ basic rules.*

Observe that in G a coalition S has value 0 if its size is even, and has value 1 if its size is odd. Games of this kind can arise when, to achieve the task, the agents have to elect one agent as a leader (coordinator), and split all remaining agents into two equal-sized groups. We now proceed to prove Theorem 3.3.

Proof. Given a conjunction of literals (a clause) C , let S_C be the set of all satisfying assignments for C , i.e., set

$$S_C = \{(x_1, \dots, x_n) \in \{0, 1\}^n \mid (x_1, \dots, x_n) \models C\}.$$

We will refer to S_C as the *subcube* associated with C , or simply a subcube.

We will say that a truth assignment $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_n) \in \{0, 1\}^n$ is *even* if $x_1 \oplus \dots \oplus x_n = 0$ and *odd* if $x_1 \oplus \dots \oplus x_n = 1$. Given a function $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, let us say that a subcube S_C is *f-active* if

$$\sum_{\substack{\mathbf{x} \in S_C \\ \mathbf{x} \text{ is even}}} f(\mathbf{x}) - \sum_{\substack{\mathbf{x} \in S_C \\ \mathbf{x} \text{ is odd}}} f(\mathbf{x}) \neq 0.$$

Note that all subcubes of size at least two are active with respect to the function $f = x_1 \oplus \dots \oplus x_n$ (where the values of f are interpreted as reals), as this function has value 1 on all odd assignments, and value 0 on all even assignments. Also, a subcube of size at least 2 has at least one odd assignment.

Now consider a basic MC-net H' with t rules. Let v' be the characteristic function of the corresponding game. We will now demonstrate that if $t < (3/2)^{n/2}/2$, there exists a subcube of size at least two which is not v' -active. This implies that the MC-net H' is not equivalent to $[I, 1 \oplus \dots \oplus n \rightarrow 1]$. As this is the case for any basic MC-net of such size, it follows that one needs $\Omega((3/2)^{n/2})$ basic rules to represent the game G .

Our proof is by the probabilistic method: we will randomly select a subcube and show that, with high probability, this subcube is of size at least two, but is not active with respect to v' . This implies that there exists *at least one* such subcube.

To generate a subcube, we construct the corresponding clause C by deciding, independently for each $i = 1, \dots, n$, whether to include x_i , $\neg x_i$ or neither: with probability $1/3$, we include x_i , but not $\neg x_i$, with probability $1/3$, we include $\neg x_i$, but not x_i , and with probability $1/3$ we include neither of them. Observe that with probability at least $1 - (2/3)^n$ the resulting subcube S_C has size at least two.

¹ We believe that Theorem 3.2 remains true even if we do not restrict the values to be non-negative. However, the proof presented here relies on the non-negativity assumption in an essential way.

For any rule $R = (P, V)$ of H' , let r be a function from $\{0, 1\}^n$ to \mathbb{R} given by $r(\mathbf{x}) = 1$ if and only if $\mathbf{x} \models P$. Consider a rule $R = (P, V)$ of H' that contains more than $n/2$ variables. Then with probability at least $1 - (2/3)^{n/2}$ there exists some $i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$ such that P contains x_i , but C contains $\neg x_i$ or P contains $\neg x_i$, but C contains x_i . If this is the case, then, for every $\mathbf{x} \in S_C$ we have $\mathbf{x} \not\models P$ so $r(\mathbf{x}) = 0$. Thus, S_C is not r -active.

On the other hand, consider a rule $R = (P, V)$ of H' that contains at most $n/2$ variables. With probability at least $1 - (2/3)^{n/2}$, there exists an $i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$ such that $x_i, \neg x_i \notin C$ and neither x_i nor $\neg x_i$ appears in P . For any even truth assignment $\mathbf{x} \in S_C$ such that $\mathbf{x} \models P$, there exists an odd truth assignment $\mathbf{x}' \in S_C$ such that $\mathbf{x}' \models P$ and vice versa: indeed, \mathbf{x}' can be obtained from \mathbf{x} by flipping the i th coordinate. Hence, in this case, too, S_C is not r -active.

By union bound, the probability that S_C is of size one or that at least one of the rules in H' activates S_C is at most $t(2/3)^{n/2} + (2/3)^n$. Therefore, if $t < (3/2)^{n/2}/2$, with non-zero probability the random subcube generated in this manner has size at least two but is not v' -active. We conclude that if $t < (3/2)^{n/2}/2$, then $v' \neq x_1 \oplus \dots \oplus x_n$. \square

Remark 3.4 It is interesting to compare our results on the expressivity of basic MC-nets to those of [5], where the authors discuss similar issues in the context of using weighted Boolean formulas to express individual agents' preferences. In particular, Theorem 4.15 of [5] is essentially equivalent to our Theorem 3.3. However, paper [5] uses a different proof technique: namely, it relies on the Fourier transform on Boolean domains, while our proof is by the probabilistic method. Also, Theorem 4.19 of [5] is equivalent to our Theorem 3.2.²

3.3 Intractability of Computing Shapley Value for General MC-nets

The results of the previous section suggest that we can obtain exponentially more compact representation by allowing the use of arbitrary Boolean expressions in the patterns. However, if we do so, we may lose an important property possessed by basic rules, namely, that of polynomial-time computability of agents' Shapley values.

Indeed, [2] shows how to efficiently compute Shapley values for basic marginal contribution nets. First, the authors observe that the Shapley value is additive over rules, and then they give an explicit formula for the Shapley value of each agent under a given basic rule. This provides a polynomial-time algorithm for computing Shapley values of all agents in basic MC-nets. However, for rules that use arbitrary Boolean formulas such an algorithm is unlikely to exist.

Theorem 3.5 *Given a game (I, v) represented by a general MC-net, i.e., an MC-net in which the patterns in the rules can be arbitrary Boolean expressions, and an agent $i \in I$, it is coNP-complete to decide whether i 's Shapley value is 0. This holds even if the coalitional game in question is described by a single rule.*

Proof. To see that this problem is in coNP, observe that to show that i 's Shapley value is not equal to 0, it suffices to exhibit a set $S \subset I \setminus \{i\}$ such that $v(S) \neq v(S \cup \{i\})$. The hardness proof is by reduction from 3-SAT. An instance of 3-SAT is given by a set of Boolean variables $X = \{x_1, \dots, x_n\}$, and a set of clauses c_1, \dots, c_m , where each clause is a disjunction of at most three literals, i.e., the variables from X or their negations. It is a "yes"-instance if the formula $c_1 \wedge \dots \wedge c_m$ is satisfiable and a "no"-instance otherwise.

Given an instance of 3-SAT, consider a coalitional game with $n + 1$ agents, and a rule of the form $c_1 \wedge \dots \wedge c_m \wedge x_{n+1} \rightarrow 1$, where x_{n+1} is a variable that does not appear in X . It is easy to see that the Shapley value of the $(n + 1)$ st player is greater than zero if and only if the original instance of 3-SAT is satisfiable. \square

As a corollary, it is NP-hard to approximate the Shapley value with any positive multiplicative error. Indeed, if we could efficiently approximate the Shapley value, then we could certainly check whether a player's Shapley value is greater than zero.

Remark 3.6 *Our hardness result also applies to computing Banzhaf power shares. Indeed, the Banzhaf index satisfies the dummy axiom. Therefore, the proof of Theorem 3.5 shows that the original instance of 3-SAT is satisfiable if and only if the Banzhaf power share of the $(n + 1)$ st player is greater than zero.*

² Paper [5] appears in the same issue of *Mathematical Logic Quarterly*. While Theorem 3.2 appears in the conference version of our paper, and the authors of [5] explicitly make use of our proof of this theorem to derive Theorem 4.19 in their paper, Theorem 3.3 was not present in the conference version of our paper, and seems to be discovered independently by the two teams.

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Shapley( $N = [\{x_1, \dots, x_n\}, (\mathcal{F}^1 \rightarrow V_1), \dots, (\mathcal{F}^r \rightarrow V_r)]$ )
1.  set  $t_1 = t_2 = \dots = t_n = 0$ ;
2.  for  $j = 1, \dots, r$ 
3.     $[\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B}, \mathbf{T}, \mathbf{F}] = \text{Sh}(\mathcal{F}^j)$ ;
4.    for  $i = 1, \dots, n$ 
5.      if  $\mathcal{F}^j$  contains  $x_i$ 
6.        set  $v_i = \frac{1}{n!} \sum_{k=0}^n k!(n-k-1)!A_{k,i}$ ;
7.      if  $\mathcal{F}^j$  contains  $\bar{x}_i$ 
8.        set  $v_i = -\frac{1}{n!} \sum_{k=0}^n k!(n-k-1)!B_{k,i}$ ;
9.      if  $\mathcal{F}^j$  contains neither, set  $v_i = 0$ ;
10.     set  $t_i = t_i + V_j \cdot v_i$ ;
11.  return  $(t_1, \dots, t_n)$ ;

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Fig. 1 Algorithm $\text{Shapley}(N)$. (The subroutine $\text{Sh}(\mathcal{F})$ is given in the appendix and described informally in the proof of Theorem 3.9, where relevant definitions are given.)

3.4 Read-once MC-nets

We have seen that there are natural coalitional games that cannot be compactly described by basic MC-nets. On the other hand, the previous subsection shows that using arbitrary patterns in MC-nets leads to computational intractability. Therefore, we would like to identify a class of Boolean formulas that is more expressive than conjunctions (and, in particular, is rich enough to express the fact that certain agents are substitutes with respect to a certain subtask), and yet allows for polynomial-time computation of Shapley values. In what follows, we show that these two conditions are satisfied by the class of *read-once Boolean formulas*. Informally, in a read-once Boolean formula, each variable can only appear once. This condition has a natural interpretation in the coalitional game setting: each agent has a set of skills/disabilities that can be useful/harmful in achieving a certain subtask; the agents can be substitutes with respect to a subtask; but no agent can contribute to more than one subtask. The subtasks are then combined into a task using Boolean connectives, such as \wedge and \vee . Read-once boolean formulae have an important role in several areas of computer science. For example, in computational learning theory, read-once boolean functions are of interest since they can be efficiently learned [10].

The formal definition of read-once formulae is as follows.

Definition 3.7 A *read-once Boolean formula* is a binary rooted tree in which each internal node is labelled with a Boolean connective, such as \wedge , \vee or \oplus , the leaves are labelled with literals (i.e., variables or their negations), and each variable appears in at most one leaf.

Remark 3.8 Our algorithm for computing the Shapley value (presented below) can be extended to the case when negations appear as nodes of indegree one throughout the tree. However, it is easy to see that any such formula can be transformed into one of the form described in Definition 3.7 with at most polynomial overhead. Therefore, in what follows we restrict our attention to formulas where negations can only appear in the leaves.

We will refer to MC-nets that use read-once Boolean formulas in their patterns as *read-once marginal contribution networks*. It is easy to see that the formulas used in Example 3.1 and Theorem 3.3 are, in fact, read-once Boolean formulas, so this representation can be considerably more compact than basic MC-nets. On the other hand, we will now show that for this class of rules it is still possible to compute the Shapley values of all players in polynomial time.

Theorem 3.9 Given an MC-net of the form $N = [I, (\mathcal{F}^1 \rightarrow V_1), \dots, (\mathcal{F}^r \rightarrow V_r)]$, where $I = \{x_1, \dots, x_n\}$, $V_1, \dots, V_r \in \mathbb{Z}$, and $\mathcal{F}^1, \dots, \mathcal{F}^r$ are read-once Boolean formulas, the algorithm $\text{Shapley}(N)$ presented in Figure 1 computes the vector of Shapley values of all players $(\phi_N(1), \dots, \phi_N(n))$. Moreover, the running time of this algorithm is $\text{poly}(n, r, \max_j \log |V_j|)$.

Proof. We present the algorithm for the case where the only Boolean connectives that appear in $\mathcal{F}^1, \dots, \mathcal{F}^r$ are \vee , \wedge and \oplus . All other Boolean connectives can be handled in a similar manner. Let $X_{\mathcal{F}}$ be the set of agents corresponding to variables that appear in a formula \mathcal{F} . To simplify notation, we will denote the i th element of I by i rather than x_i . Recall that we say that a coalition X satisfies a formula \mathcal{F} (and write $X \models \mathcal{F}$) if \mathcal{F} is satisfied

by a truth assignment in which the variables that correspond to agents in X are set to `true`, while the variables that correspond to agents not in X are set to `false`.

Suppose that \mathcal{F} is a subformula (subtree) of an input formula \mathcal{F}^j . For all $i \in X_{\mathcal{F}}$ and $k \in \{0, \dots, n\}$, we now define the following quantities.

- $A_{k,i}(\mathcal{F}) = |\{X \subseteq X_{\mathcal{F}} : |X| = k, i \notin X, X \not\models \mathcal{F}, X \cup \{i\} \models \mathcal{F}\}|$
- $B_{k,i}(\mathcal{F}) = |\{X \subseteq X_{\mathcal{F}} : |X| = k, i \notin X, X \models \mathcal{F}, X \cup \{i\} \not\models \mathcal{F}\}|$
- $T_k(\mathcal{F}) = |\{X \subseteq X_{\mathcal{F}} : |X| = k, X \models \mathcal{F}\}|$
- $F_k(\mathcal{F}) = |\{X \subseteq X_{\mathcal{F}} : |X| = k, X \not\models \mathcal{F}\}|$

The first two of these quantities denote the number of subsets (of a given size k) of agents for which the addition of agent i causes a given formula to become respectively satisfied, or unsatisfied. The latter two denote the number of subsets (of size k) of agents that respectively satisfy, or fail to satisfy, a formula. These quantities are computed recursively as follows.

First, suppose that $\mathcal{F} = x_j$. We have $A_{0,i}(\mathcal{F}) = 1$ if $i = j$ and 0 otherwise, and $A_{k,i}(\mathcal{F}) = 0$ for $k > 0$. Similarly, $B_{k,i}(\mathcal{F}) = 0$ for all $k \geq 0$. Finally, $T_k(\mathcal{F}) = 1$ if $k = 1$ and 0 otherwise, $F_k(\mathcal{F}) = 1$ if $k = 0$ and 0 otherwise.

Next, suppose that $\mathcal{F} = \bar{x}_j$. We have $A_{k,i}(\mathcal{F}) = 0$ for any $k = 0, \dots, n$, $B_{k,i}(\mathcal{F}) = 1$ if $k = 0$ and 0 otherwise, $T_k(\mathcal{F}) = 1$ if $k = 0$ and 0 otherwise, $F_k(\mathcal{F}) = 1$ if $k = 1$ and 0 otherwise.

Now, suppose that $\mathcal{F} = \mathcal{F}_1 \vee \mathcal{F}_2$, and we have computed $A_{k,i}(\mathcal{F}_j)$, $B_{k,i}(\mathcal{F}_j)$, $T_k(\mathcal{F}_j)$, and $F_k(\mathcal{F}_j)$ for $i = 1, \dots, n$, $k = 0, \dots, n$ and $j = 1, 2$.

Note that since \mathcal{F} is a read-once formula, each variable x_i (or its negation) may appear in \mathcal{F}_1 or \mathcal{F}_2 , but not in both of these subformulas. First, suppose that $i \in X_{\mathcal{F}_1}$. Consider a set $Y \subseteq X_{\mathcal{F}} \setminus \{i\}$ of size k such that $Y_1 = Y \cap X_{\mathcal{F}_1}$ has size s and $Y_2 = Y \cap X_{\mathcal{F}_2}$ has size $k - s$. We have $Y \not\models \mathcal{F}$ if and only if $Y_1 \not\models \mathcal{F}_1$ and $Y_2 \not\models \mathcal{F}_2$. Moreover, in this case $Y \cup \{i\} \models \mathcal{F}$ if and only if $Y_1 \cup \{i\} \models \mathcal{F}_1$. Therefore, Y can contribute to $A_{k,i}(\mathcal{F})$ if and only if Y_1 contributes to $A_{s,i}(\mathcal{F}_1)$ and Y_2 contributes to $F_{k-s}(\mathcal{F}_2)$. Consequently,

$$A_{k,i}(\mathcal{F}) = \sum_{s=0}^k A_{s,i}(\mathcal{F}_1) F_{k-s}(\mathcal{F}_2).$$

Similarly, we have $Y \cup \{i\} \not\models \mathcal{F}$ if and only if $Y_1 \cup \{i\} \not\models \mathcal{F}_1$ and $Y_2 \not\models \mathcal{F}_2$. Moreover, in this case $Y \models \mathcal{F}$ if and only if $Y_1 \models \mathcal{F}_1$. Therefore, Y can contribute to $B_{k,i}(\mathcal{F})$ if and only if Y_1 contributes to $B_{s,i}(\mathcal{F}_1)$ and Y_2 contributes to $F_{k-s}(\mathcal{F}_2)$. Consequently,

$$B_{k,i}(\mathcal{F}) = \sum_{s=0}^k B_{s,i}(\mathcal{F}_1) F_{k-s}(\mathcal{F}_2).$$

Similarly, if $i \in X_{\mathcal{F}_2}$, we have

$$A_{k,i}(\mathcal{F}) = \sum_{s=0}^k A_{s,i}(\mathcal{F}_2) F_{k-s}(\mathcal{F}_1), \quad B_{k,i}(\mathcal{F}) = \sum_{s=0}^k B_{s,i}(\mathcal{F}_2) F_{k-s}(\mathcal{F}_1).$$

Finally, in both cases we have

$$\begin{aligned} T_k(\mathcal{F}) &= \sum_{s=0}^k (T_s(\mathcal{F}_1) T_{k-s}(\mathcal{F}_2) + F_s(\mathcal{F}_1) T_{k-s}(\mathcal{F}_2) + T_s(\mathcal{F}_1) F_{k-s}(\mathcal{F}_2)) \\ F_k(\mathcal{F}) &= \sum_{s=0}^k F_s(\mathcal{F}_1) F_{k-s}(\mathcal{F}_2). \end{aligned}$$

The case when $\mathcal{F} = \mathcal{F}_1 \wedge \mathcal{F}_2$ is similar. First, suppose that $i \in X_{\mathcal{F}_1}$. Consider a set $Y \subseteq X_{\mathcal{F}} \setminus \{i\}$ of size k such that $Y_1 = Y \cap X_{\mathcal{F}_1}$ has size s and $Y_2 = Y \cap X_{\mathcal{F}_2}$ has size $k - s$. We have $Y \cup \{i\} \models \mathcal{F}$ if and only if

$Y_1 \cup \{i\} \models \mathcal{F}_1$ and $Y_2 \models \mathcal{F}_2$. Moreover, in this case $Y \not\models \mathcal{F}$ if and only if $Y_1 \not\models \mathcal{F}_1$. Therefore, Y can contribute to $A_{k,i}(\mathcal{F})$ if and only if Y_1 contributes to $A_{s,i}(\mathcal{F}_1)$ and Y_2 contributes to $T_{k-s}(\mathcal{F}_2)$. Consequently,

$$A_{k,i}(\mathcal{F}) = \sum_{s=0}^k A_{s,i}(\mathcal{F}_1)T_{k-s}(\mathcal{F}_2).$$

Furthermore, we have $Y \models \mathcal{F}$ if and only if $Y_1 \models \mathcal{F}_1$ and $Y_2 \models \mathcal{F}_2$. Moreover, in this case $Y \cup \{i\} \not\models \mathcal{F}$ if and only if $Y_1 \cup \{i\} \not\models \mathcal{F}_1$. Therefore, Y can contribute to $B_{k,i}(\mathcal{F})$ if and only if Y_1 contributes to $B_{s,i}(\mathcal{F}_1)$ and Y_2 contributes to $T_{k-s}(\mathcal{F}_2)$. Consequently,

$$B_{k,i}(\mathcal{F}) = \sum_{s=0}^k B_{s,i}(\mathcal{F}_1)T_{k-s}(\mathcal{F}_2).$$

Similarly, if $x_i \in X_{\mathcal{F}_2}$, we have

$$A_{k,i}(\mathcal{F}) = \sum_{s=0}^k A_{s,i}(\mathcal{F}_2)T_{k-s}(\mathcal{F}_1), \quad B_{k,i}(\mathcal{F}) = \sum_{s=0}^k B_{s,i}(\mathcal{F}_2)T_{k-s}(\mathcal{F}_1).$$

Also, in both cases we have

$$\begin{aligned} T_k(\mathcal{F}) &= \sum_{s=0}^k T_s(\mathcal{F}_1)T_{k-s}(\mathcal{F}_2) \\ F_k(\mathcal{F}) &= \sum_{s=0}^k (F_s(\mathcal{F}_1)F_{k-s}(\mathcal{F}_2) + F_s(\mathcal{F}_1)T_{k-s}(\mathcal{F}_2) + T_s(\mathcal{F}_1)F_{k-s}(\mathcal{F}_2)). \end{aligned}$$

Finally, suppose $\mathcal{F} = \mathcal{F}_1 \oplus \mathcal{F}_2$. First, suppose that $i \in X_{\mathcal{F}_1}$. Consider a set $Y \subseteq X_{\mathcal{F}} \setminus \{i\}$ of size k such that $Y_1 = Y \cap X_{\mathcal{F}_1}$ has size s and $Y_2 = Y \cap X_{\mathcal{F}_2}$ has size $k-s$. Now, the set Y can contribute to $A_{k,i}(\mathcal{F})$ in two ways: (1) $Y_1 \models \mathcal{F}_1$ and $Y_2 \models \mathcal{F}_2$ and $Y_1 \cup \{i\} \not\models \mathcal{F}_1$ (in which case Y_1 contributes to $B_{s,i}(\mathcal{F}_1)$ and Y_2 contributes to $T_{k-s}(\mathcal{F}_2)$) or (2) $Y_1 \not\models \mathcal{F}_1$ and $Y_2 \not\models \mathcal{F}_2$ and $Y_1 \cup \{i\} \models \mathcal{F}_1$ (in which case Y_1 contributes to $A_{s,i}(\mathcal{F}_1)$ and Y_2 contributes to $F_{k-s}(\mathcal{F}_2)$). Consequently,

$$A_{k,i}(\mathcal{F}) = \sum_{s=0}^k (B_{s,i}(\mathcal{F}_1)T_{k-s}(\mathcal{F}_2) + A_{s,i}(\mathcal{F}_1)F_{k-s}(\mathcal{F}_2)).$$

Similarly,

$$B_{k,i}(\mathcal{F}) = \sum_{s=0}^k (B_{s,i}(\mathcal{F}_1)F_{k-s}(\mathcal{F}_2) + A_{s,i}(\mathcal{F}_1)T_{k-s}(\mathcal{F}_2)).$$

Similarly, if $i \in X_{\mathcal{F}_2}$, we have

$$\begin{aligned} A_{k,i}(\mathcal{F}) &= \sum_{s=0}^k (B_{s,i}(\mathcal{F}_2)T_{k-s}(\mathcal{F}_1) + A_{s,i}(\mathcal{F}_2)F_{k-s}(\mathcal{F}_1)) \\ B_{k,i}(\mathcal{F}) &= \sum_{s=0}^k (B_{s,i}(\mathcal{F}_2)F_{k-s}(\mathcal{F}_1) + A_{s,i}(\mathcal{F}_2)T_{k-s}(\mathcal{F}_1)). \end{aligned}$$

Finally, in both cases we have

$$\begin{aligned} T_k(\mathcal{F}) &= \sum_{s=0}^k T_s(\mathcal{F}_1)F_{k-s}(\mathcal{F}_2) + F_s(\mathcal{F}_1)T_{k-s}(\mathcal{F}_2) \\ F_k(\mathcal{F}) &= \sum_{s=0}^k F_s(\mathcal{F}_1)F_{k-s}(\mathcal{F}_2) + T_s(\mathcal{F}_1)T_{k-s}(\mathcal{F}_2) \end{aligned}$$

The algorithm $\text{Sh}(\mathcal{F})$ for recursive computation of $A_{k,i}(\mathcal{F})$, $B_{k,i}(\mathcal{F})$, $T_k(\mathcal{F})$, and $F_k(\mathcal{F})$ outlined above is formally described in the appendix. For any formula \mathcal{F} , the algorithm $\text{Sh}(\mathcal{F})$ returns four lists of numbers, namely, $\mathbf{A} = \{A_{k,i} \mid k = 0, \dots, n, i = 1, \dots, n\}$, $\mathbf{B} = \{B_{k,i} \mid k = 0, \dots, n, i = 1, \dots, n\}$, $\mathbf{T} = \{T_k \mid k = 0, \dots, n\}$, and $\mathbf{F} = \{F_k \mid k = 0, \dots, n\}$. The entries in these lists correspond to the quantities $A_{k,i}(\mathcal{F})$, $B_{k,i}(\mathcal{F})$, $T_k(\mathcal{F})$, and $F_k(\mathcal{F})$ defined above.

Our main algorithm $\text{Shapley}(N)$ is described in Figure 1. It uses the algorithm $\text{Sh}(\mathcal{F})$ as a subroutine. To prove the correctness of our algorithm, it remains to show that lines 5–8 of our algorithm correctly compute the Shapley value of agent i in the MC-net N_j given by a single rule $\mathcal{F}^j \rightarrow 1$: by the linearity of the Shapley value, this would imply that the output of our algorithm is indeed the list of Shapley values of the agents in N .

Consider an agent i in the game described by N_j . As \mathcal{F}^j is a read-once formula, it can contain x_i or \bar{x}_i , but not both. If the formula \mathcal{F}^j contains x_i , then i 's contribution to the value of any coalition is non-negative. Furthermore, for any coalition of size k counted in $A_{k,i}(\mathcal{F}^j)$, the agent i contributes 1 to the value of this coalition if he appears in a permutation right after the members of this coalition. Therefore, we have

$$\phi_{N_j}(i) = \frac{1}{n!} \sum_{k=0}^n k!(n-k-1)!A_{k,i}(\mathcal{F}^j). \quad (5)$$

Similarly, if the formula \mathcal{F}^j contains \bar{x}_i , then i 's contribution to the value of any coalition in N_j is non-positive and can be computed as

$$\phi_{N_j}(i) = -\frac{1}{n!} \sum_{k=0}^n k!(n-k-1)!B_{k,i}(\mathcal{F}^j). \quad (6)$$

This is exactly the formulas used by our algorithm to compute the Shapley values of all players in N_j . We conclude that $\text{Shapley}(N)$ correctly computes the Shapley values of all agents. Moreover, it is clear that the running time of our algorithm is polynomial in n , r , and $\max_j \log |V_j|$. \square

Remark 3.10 *A similar algorithm can also be used to compute the Banzhaf power share of each player as long as the value of each coalition is given by a single rule based on a read-once Boolean formula. For any agent i and any $k = 0, \dots, n$, our algorithm computes the number of coalitions C of size k such that adding i to C changes the value of the coalition. Therefore, if the formula \mathcal{F} contains x_i , we have*

$$\beta(i) = \frac{1}{2^{n-1}} \sum_{k=0}^n A_{k,i}(\mathcal{F}),$$

and if the formula \mathcal{F} contains \bar{x}_i , we have

$$\beta(i) = -\frac{1}{2^{n-1}} \sum_{k=0}^n B_{k,i}(\mathcal{F}).$$

However, as Banzhaf power shares do not satisfy the additivity axiom, our algorithm does not give a way to directly compute the Banzhaf values in games that are described by MC-nets with two or more rules, even if these rules are basic.

4 Network flow games

In this section, we show how to apply the techniques of Section 3 to computing Shapley values and Banzhaf power shares in network flow games.

4.1 Previous Work

Network flow games have been studied in the game theory literature [11, 12], and, more recently, in the context of multi-agent systems [6]. In this paper, we will use the model of [6], which views a network flow game as a simple game, where agents correspond to edges in the network, and a coalition wins if it admits a flow of a given size and loses otherwise. We will first define the network flow problem, and then introduce the respective game.

Definition 4.1 A network $\mathcal{N} = (V, E, s, t, \mathbf{c})$ is given by a set of nodes V , a set of edges $E \subseteq V \times V$, a source $s \in V$, a sink $t \in V$, and a list of capacities $\mathbf{c} = \{c_e\}_{e \in E}$, $c_e > 0$. We say that $\mathbf{f} = \{f_e\}_{e \in E}$ is a valid flow of size k in \mathcal{N} if

- (capacity constraints): $f_e \leq c_e$ for all $e \in E$.
- (flow preservation constraints): for any $v \in V \setminus \{s, t\}$,

$$\sum_{(v',v) \in E} f_{(v',v)} = \sum_{(v,v'') \in E} f_{(v,v'')}.$$

- (size of the flow):

$$\sum_{(s,v) \in E} f_{(s,v)} = \sum_{(w,t) \in E} f_{(w,t)} = k.$$

We are now ready to define the class of network flow games. (Note that we assume that all capacities are integer.)

Definition 4.2 A network flow game is given by a network $\mathcal{N} = (V, E, s, t, \mathbf{c})$ and a target flow value K . Each edge $e \in E$ is controlled by a different agent; therefore, we identify the set of agents with the set of edges. A coalition $E' \subseteq E$ is *winning* if the network $\mathcal{N}' = (V, E', s, t, \mathbf{c}')$, where $\mathbf{c}' = \{c_e\}_{e \in E'}$, admits a flow of size K from s to t , and is *losing* otherwise.

Connectivity games are a special class of network flow games that satisfy $K = 1$ and $c_e = 1$ for any $e \in E$. In other words, in a connectivity game, a coalition is winning if it contains a path from s to t , and is losing otherwise.

Value division schemes for network flow games were first studied by Bachrach and Rosenschein [6]. Paper [6] shows that for general networks, i.e., ones where there is no restrictions on the structure of the underlying network \mathcal{N} , and the capacities and the target flow value are integer numbers given in binary, computing Banzhaf shares of all players is $\#P$ -hard. On the positive side, they provide a polynomial-time algorithm for computing the Banzhaf shares in the special case of connectivity games on *bounded-layer networks* (for the definition of a bounded-layer network, see [6]).

4.2 Flow Games on Series-Parallel Networks and MC-nets

In this section, we extend the results of [6] by providing a polynomial-time algorithm for power indices in a widely studied class of networks, namely, series-parallel networks. This is a class of networks with a clear hierarchical structure that enables us to use ideas from the previous section. Our algorithm can be used to compute both Shapley and Banzhaf values. Moreover, unlike the algorithm of [6], it is not restricted to connectivity games, but can be applied for an arbitrary target flow value K . However, the running time of our algorithm is exponential in K . Therefore, our algorithm for general network flow games on series-parallel graphs is a *pseudopolynomial* algorithm, i.e., an algorithm whose running time is polynomial if all input values (i.e., the edge capacities and the target flow value) are given in unary. Alternatively, it can be said to run in polynomial time if all edge capacities and the target flow value are polynomially bounded, which is a realistic scenario in many applications. In Section 4.3, we will see that this is essentially the best we can do, as even for series-parallel networks the problem of computing the Shapley value is NP-hard and is therefore unlikely to have a polynomial-time algorithm.

We start by formally defining series-parallel networks.

Definition 4.3 A *series-parallel network* (SPN) is a network $\mathcal{N} = (V, E, s, t, \mathbf{c})$, such that one of the following conditions holds:

Base case: A single edge (s, t) , i.e., a network of the form

$$(\{s, t\}, \{(s, t)\}, s, t, c_{(s,t)})$$

is an SPN.

Series: Let $\mathcal{N}^1 = (V^1, E^1, s^1, t^1, \mathbf{c}^1)$ and $\mathcal{N}^2 = (V^2, E^2, s^2, t^2, \mathbf{c}^2)$ be two SPNs such that $V^1 \cap V^2 = \emptyset$. Set $V = V^1 \cup V^2$, $E = E^1 \cup E^2$, merge t^1 with s^2 , and set $\mathbf{c} = \mathbf{c}^1 \cup \mathbf{c}^2$. Then

$$(V, E, s = s^1, t = t^2, \mathbf{c})$$

is an SPN.

Parallel: Let $\mathcal{N}^1 = (V^1, E^1, s^1, t^1, \mathbf{c}^1)$ and $\mathcal{N}^2 = (V^2, E^2, s^2, t^2, \mathbf{c}^2)$ be two SPNs such that $V^1 \cap V^2 = \emptyset$. Set $V = V^1 \cup V^2$, $E = E^1 \cup E^2$, merge s^1 with s^2 and t^1 with t^2 , and set $\mathbf{c} = \mathbf{c}^1 \cup \mathbf{c}^2$. Then

$$(V, E, s = s^1 = s^2, t = t^1 = t^2, \mathbf{c})$$

is an SPN.

We will now show that even though network flow games and marginal contribution nets appear to be quite different, we can re-use the algorithm of the previous section to compute the power indices in the connectivity game on a series-parallel network. To do so, we will now establish a connection between series-parallel networks and read-once Boolean formulas. For connectivity games we have $c_e = 1$ for all $e \in E$, so in this reduction we omit the list of capacities from the description of a network.

Given a series-parallel network $\mathcal{N} = (V, E, s, t)$, $E = \{e_1, \dots, e_n\}$, we will recursively construct a corresponding read-once Boolean formula $\mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{N}}$, $X_{\mathcal{F}} = \{x_1, \dots, x_n\}$ as follows. If \mathcal{N} consists of a single edge e_i , set $F_{\mathcal{N}} = x_i$. If \mathcal{N} has been obtained by connecting two networks \mathcal{N}_1 and \mathcal{N}_2 in parallel, set $\mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{N}} = \mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{N}_1} \vee \mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{N}_2}$. Finally, if \mathcal{N} has been obtained by connecting two networks \mathcal{N}_1 and \mathcal{N}_2 in series, set $\mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{N}} = \mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{N}_1} \wedge \mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{N}_2}$.

It is easy to see that the resulting formula is read-once, and this transformation can be performed in polynomial time. Moreover, $S = \{e_{i_1}, \dots, e_{i_t}\}$ is a winning coalition in a connectivity game on the network \mathcal{N} if and only if $S' = \{x_{i_1}, \dots, x_{i_t}\}$ is a winning coalition in the marginal contribution net described by the rule $\mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{N}} \rightarrow 1$. Consequently, the Shapley value of any player e_i in the original game is the same as the Shapley value of its counterpart x_i in the new game. The same is true for the Banzhaf power shares. Consequently, we have the following theorem.

Theorem 4.4 *There exists a polynomial-time algorithm to compute Shapley values and Banzhaf power shares in connectivity games on series-parallel graphs.*

To generalise this result to network flow games, we need to modify the algorithm of Section 3 to take into account the size of the flow.

Theorem 4.5 *There is an algorithm that, given a series-parallel network $\mathcal{N} = (V, E, s, t, \mathbf{c})$, $c_i \in \mathbb{Z}$ for $i \in E$, $|E| = n$, and a target flow value K , computes the Shapley values of all players in the game (\mathcal{N}, K) , and runs in time polynomial in n , $\sum_{e \in E} c_e$, and K .*

Proof. Given a network $\mathcal{N} = (V, E, s, t, \mathbf{c})$, let $f(\mathcal{N})$ denote the size of the maximum flow in \mathcal{N} . It is well-known that $f(\mathcal{N})$ can be computed in time polynomial in n and $\log \sum_{e \in E} c_e$. Set $C = \sum_{e \in E} c_e$; clearly, $f(\mathcal{N}) \leq C$. For any network $\mathcal{N} = (V, E, s, t, \mathbf{c})$ and any $S \subseteq E$, set $\mathcal{N}_S = (V, S, s, t, \{c_e\}_{e \in S})$. For all $k = 0, \dots, n$, $e \in E$, $0 \leq X < Y \leq C$, let $A_{k,e,X,Y}(\mathcal{N})$ be the number of sets $S \subseteq E$ of size k such that $e \notin S$ and $f(\mathcal{N}_S) = X$, $f(\mathcal{N}_{S \cup \{e\}}) = Y$. Also, let $T_{k,X}$ be the number of sets $S \subseteq E$ of size k such that $f(\mathcal{N}_S) = X$.

Given the values $A_{k,e,X,Y}(\mathcal{N})$ for $k = 0, \dots, n$, $X, Y = 0, \dots, C$, it is easy to compute the Shapley value of the agent e . Indeed, for each coalition S counted in $A_{k,e,X,Y}(\mathcal{N})$ such that $X < K \leq Y$, agent e contributes 1 to the value of the permutation where he appears directly after the members of S . Hence, we have

$$\phi_{(\mathcal{N}, K)}(e) = \frac{1}{n!} \sum_{k=0}^n \sum_{\substack{X < K \\ Y \geq K}} k!(n-k-1)! A_{k,e,X,Y}(\mathcal{N}).$$

It remains to show how to compute $A_{k,e,X,Y}(\mathcal{N})$ for all $k = 0, \dots, n$, $e \in E$, $0 \leq X < Y \leq C$. This is done recursively, by simultaneously computing $A_{k,e,X,Y}$ and $T_{k,X}$ for subnetworks of the original network \mathcal{N} .

If \mathcal{N} is a single edge e with capacity c_e , then we have $A_{k,e,X,Y}(\mathcal{N}) = 1$ if $k = 0$, $X = 0$ and $Y = c_e$; otherwise, $A_{k,e,X,Y}(\mathcal{N}) = 0$. Also, $T_{k,X}(\mathcal{N}) = 1$ if $k = 0$ and $X = 0$, or $k = 1$ and $X = c_e$, and $T_{k,X}(\mathcal{N}) = 0$ otherwise.

Now, suppose that the network \mathcal{N} is obtained by connecting two networks $\mathcal{N}^1 = (V^1, E^1, s^1, t^1, \mathbf{c}^1)$ and $\mathcal{N}^2 = (V^2, E^2, s^2, t^2, \mathbf{c}^2)$ in parallel. For any $S \subseteq E$, $f(\mathcal{N}_S) = X$ if and only if for some $X' \leq X$ we have $f(\mathcal{N}_{S \cap E^2}^2) = X'$ and $f(\mathcal{N}_{S \cap E^1}^1) = X - X'$. Hence, if $e \in E^1$, we have

$$A_{k,e,X,Y}(\mathcal{N}) = \sum_{k'=0}^k \sum_{X'=0}^X A_{k-k',e,X-X',Y-X'}(\mathcal{N}_1) T_{k',X'}(\mathcal{N}_2),$$

and if $e \in E^2$, we have

$$A_{k,e,X,Y}(\mathcal{N}) = \sum_{k'=0}^k \sum_{X'=0}^X A_{k-k',e,X-X',Y-X'}(\mathcal{N}_2) T_{k',X'}(\mathcal{N}_1).$$

Observe that if $X < Y$, then we have $X - X' < Y - X'$, so the quantity $A_{k-k',e,X-X',Y-X'}$ is well-defined. Also, we have

$$T_{k,X}(\mathcal{N}) = \sum_{k'=0}^k \sum_{X'=0}^X T_{k',X'}(\mathcal{N}_1) T_{k-k',X-X'}(\mathcal{N}_2).$$

Finally, suppose that \mathcal{N} is obtained by connecting two networks $\mathcal{N}^1 = (V^1, E^1, s^1, t^1, \mathbf{c}^1)$ and $\mathcal{N}^2 = (V^2, E^2, s^2, t^2, \mathbf{c}^2)$ in series. Fix an edge $e \in E^1$ and consider a set $S \subseteq E \setminus \{e\}$. Suppose that $f(\mathcal{N}_S) = X$, $f(\mathcal{N}_{S \cup \{e\}}) = Y$, $X \leq Y$. This can happen in two cases: either (i) $f(\mathcal{N}_{S \cap E^1}^1) = X$, $f(\mathcal{N}_{S \cup \{e\} \cap E^1}^1) = Y$ and $f(\mathcal{N}_{S \cap E^2}^2) \geq Y$, or (ii) $f(\mathcal{N}_{S \cap E^1}^1) = X$, $f(\mathcal{N}_{S \cup \{e\} \cap E^1}^1) = Y' > Y$ and $f(\mathcal{N}_{S \cap E^2}^2) = Y$.

Consequently, if $e \in E^1$, we have

$$A_{k,e,X,Y}(\mathcal{N}) = \sum_{k'=0}^k \sum_{Z=Y}^C A_{k',e,X,Y}(\mathcal{N}_1) T_{k-k',Z}(\mathcal{N}_2) + \sum_{k'=0}^k \sum_{Y'=Y+1}^C A_{k',e,X,Y'}(\mathcal{N}_1) T_{k-k',Y}(\mathcal{N}_2),$$

and if $e \in E^2$, we have

$$A_{k,e,X,Y}(\mathcal{N}) = \sum_{k'=0}^k \sum_{Z=Y}^C A_{k',e,X,Y}(\mathcal{N}_2) T_{k-k',Z}(\mathcal{N}_1) + \sum_{k'=0}^k \sum_{Y'=Y+1}^C A_{k',e,X,Y'}(\mathcal{N}_2) T_{k-k',Y}(\mathcal{N}_1).$$

Also, we have

$$T_{k,X}(\mathcal{N}) = \sum_{k'=0}^k \sum_{X'=X}^C [T_{k',X}(\mathcal{N}_1) T_{k-k',X'}(\mathcal{N}_2) + T_{k',X}(\mathcal{N}_2) T_{k-k',X'}(\mathcal{N}_1)].$$

This completes the description of the procedure for computing $A_{k,e,X,Y}(\mathcal{N})$, and hence the proof. \square

Remark 4.6 *Just as in the previous section, once we have computed the values $A_{k,e,X,Y}(\mathcal{N})$, we can use them to determine the Banzhaf power shares of all players in time polynomial in K , n , and $\sum_{i \in E} c_i$.*

4.3 Hardness Results for Large Capacities

The running time of the algorithm described in the previous subsection is polynomial in $|E|$, $\sum_{e \in E} \{c_e\}$ and K rather than $\log \sum_{e \in E} \{c_e\}$ and $\log K$, i.e., it is exponential in the size of the input. This leaves open the question of designing a polynomial-time algorithm for computing the Shapley value in network flow games on series-parallel graphs with unrestricted capacities and target flow values. While [6] shows that this problem is #P-hard for general graphs, no similar result was known for our setting. In this section, we answer this question. Namely, we show that for series-parallel graphs where the edge capacities and the target flow value are given in binary, checking whether a player is not a dummy (and hence whether his Shapley value and Banzhaf power share are non-zero) is NP-hard.

Our reduction is from PARTITION, which is a well-known NP-complete problem.

Definition 4.7 An instance of PARTITION is given by a set of n integer weights $W = \{w_1, \dots, w_n\}$. It is a “yes”-instance if it is possible to partition W into two subsets $W_1 \subseteq W$, $W_2 \subseteq W$ so that $W_1 \cap W_2 = \emptyset$, $W_1 \cup W_2 = W$, and the sum of the weights in each subset is equal: $\sum_{w_i \in W_1} w_i = \sum_{w_i \in W_2} w_i$. If there is no such partition, it is a “no”-instance.

Theorem 4.8 *Given a network flow game $G = (\mathcal{N}, K)$ such that $\mathcal{N} = (V, E, s, t, \mathbf{c})$ is a series-parallel network, and an agent $e \in E$, it is NP-hard to decide whether e is not a dummy player.*

Proof. Given an instance $W = \{w_1, \dots, w_n\}$ of PARTITION, we construct a network game as follows. We set $V = \{s, v_1, \dots, v_n, v_{n+1}, t\}$. There are edges in E from s to each v_i , $i = 1, \dots, n+1$, and from each v_i , $i = 1, \dots, n+1$, to t . The capacities are chosen as follows. Let $C_{\max} = \sum_i w_i$. Let the capacity of the edge (s, v_i) be $2w_i$ for $i = 1, \dots, n$, and let the capacity of the edge (v_i, t) be $2C_{\max}$ for $i = 1, \dots, n+1$. Finally, let the capacity of the edge (s, v_{n+1}) be 1. Set the target flow value to be $\sum_i w_i + 1$. It is easy to see that the agent that owns the edge (s, v_{n+1}) is a dummy if and only if the original instance of PARTITION is a “no”-instance. \square

5 Conclusions

We have presented read-once MC-nets, which retain the attractive computational properties of basic MC-nets while being exponentially more compact in some cases. We have also demonstrated how the algorithmic ideas developed in the context of read-once MC-nets can be applied to other domains—in particular, network flow games on series-parallel networks.

Our work is related to a large body of current work on the computational aspects of cooperative games—see, e.g., [1, 9, 2, 6, 13, 14, 4]. Work in this area is primarily focused around three interrelated issues. First is the issue of succinctly representing coalitional games; in particular, constructing representations for the characteristic functions of cooperative games that require space at most polynomial in the number of agents in the system. Second is the issue of efficiently computing solution concepts for cooperative games; there is some tension between on the one hand the desire for compact representations and on the other, computational tractability. Finally, researchers have considered interpretations of cooperative games in computational settings, e.g., interpreting coalitional games as the ability to ensure a particular network flow.

Many issues suggest themselves for further study. Most obviously, one might study other constraints on the logical construction of MC-net rules which retain tractability while yielding further compactness. Results in the area of Boolean function complexity and representation will perhaps be of value here. Another interesting question is whether we need the full power of arbitrary Boolean connectives to achieve exponential savings over basic MC-nets, or using \wedge , \vee and \neg would suffice for this purpose. Indeed, Example 1 shows that read-once MC-nets that use \wedge , \vee and \neg only can be exponentially more succinct than basic MC-nets as long as we do not allow MC-nets with negative right-hand sides; we would like to know if this is still the case if negative right-hand sides are allowed. Also, one might investigate the extent to which our techniques can be applied to other classes of coalitional games, beyond network flow games.

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A The procedure $\text{Sh}(\mathcal{F})$

$\text{Sh}(\mathcal{F})$

```

if  $\mathcal{F} = x_j$  then
  for  $k = 0, \dots, n$ 
    if  $k = 1$  then  $T_k = 1$  else  $T_k = 0$ ;
    if  $k = 0$  then  $F_k = 1$  else  $F_k = 0$ ;
    for  $i = 1, \dots, n$ 
      if  $(i = j, k = 0)$  then  $A_{k,i} = 1$  else  $A_{k,i} = 0$ ;
       $B_{k,i} = 0$ ;
if  $\mathcal{F} = \bar{x}_j$  then
  for  $k = 0, \dots, n$ 
    if  $k = 0$  then  $T_k = 1$  else  $T_k = 0$ ;
    if  $k = 1$  then  $F_k = 1$  else  $F_k = 0$ ;
    for  $i = 1, \dots, n$ 
       $A_{k,i} = 0$ ;
      if  $(i = j, k = 0)$  then  $B_{k,i} = 1$  else  $B_{k,i} = 0$ ;
if  $\mathcal{F} = \mathcal{F}_1 \vee \mathcal{F}_2$  then
   $[\mathbf{A}^1, \mathbf{B}^1, \mathbf{T}^1, \mathbf{F}^1] = \text{Sh}(\mathcal{F}_1)$ ;  $[\mathbf{A}^2, \mathbf{B}^2, \mathbf{T}^2, \mathbf{F}^2] = \text{Sh}(\mathcal{F}_2)$ ;
  for  $k = 0, \dots, n$ 
     $T_k = \sum_{s=0}^k (T_s^1 T_{k-s}^2 + F_s^1 T_{k-s}^2 + T_s^1 F_{k-s}^2)$ ;  $F_k = \sum_{s=0}^k F_s^1 F_{k-s}^2$ 
    for  $i = 1, \dots, n$ 
      if  $x_i$  does not appear in  $\mathcal{F}$  then  $A_{k,i} = 0$ ,  $B_{k,i} = 0$ 
      if  $x_i$  appears in  $\mathcal{F}_1$  then
         $A_{k,i} = \sum_{s=0}^k A_{s,i}^1 F_{k-s}^2$ ;  $B_{k,i} = \sum_{s=0}^k B_{s,i}^1 F_{k-s}^2$ ;
      if  $x_i$  appears in  $\mathcal{F}_2$  then
         $A_{k,i} = \sum_{s=0}^k A_{s,i}^2 F_{k-s}^1$ ;  $B_{k,i} = \sum_{s=0}^k B_{s,i}^2 F_{k-s}^1$ ;
if  $\mathcal{F} = \mathcal{F}_1 \wedge \mathcal{F}_2$  then
   $[\mathbf{A}^1, \mathbf{B}^1, \mathbf{T}^1, \mathbf{F}^1] = \text{Sh}(\mathcal{F}_1)$ ;  $[\mathbf{A}^2, \mathbf{B}^2, \mathbf{T}^2, \mathbf{F}^2] = \text{Sh}(\mathcal{F}_2)$ ;
  for  $k = 0, \dots, n$ 
     $T_k = \sum_{s=0}^k T_s^1 T_{k-s}^2$ ;  $F_k = \sum_{s=0}^k (F_s^1 F_{k-s}^2 + F_s^1 T_{k-s}^2 + T_s^1 F_{k-s}^2)$ 
    for  $i = 1, \dots, n$ 
      if  $x_i$  does not appear in  $\mathcal{F}$  then  $A_{k,i} = 0$ ,  $B_{k,i} = 0$ 
      if  $x_i$  appears in  $\mathcal{F}_1$  then
         $A_{k,i} = \sum_{s=0}^k A_{s,i}^1 T_{k-s}^2$ ;  $B_{k,i} = \sum_{s=0}^k B_{s,i}^1 T_{k-s}^2$ ;
      if  $x_i$  appears in  $\mathcal{F}_2$  then
         $A_{k,i} = \sum_{s=0}^k A_{s,i}^2 T_{k-s}^1$ ;  $B_{k,i} = \sum_{s=0}^k B_{s,i}^2 T_{k-s}^1$ ;
if  $\mathcal{F} = \mathcal{F}_1 \oplus \mathcal{F}_2$  then
   $[\mathbf{A}^1, \mathbf{B}^1, \mathbf{T}^1, \mathbf{F}^1] = \text{Sh}(\mathcal{F}_1)$ ;  $[\mathbf{A}^2, \mathbf{B}^2, \mathbf{T}^2, \mathbf{F}^2] = \text{Sh}(\mathcal{F}_2)$ ;
  for  $k = 0, \dots, n$ 
     $T_k = \sum_{s=0}^k (T_s^1 F_{k-s}^2 + F_s^1 T_{k-s}^2)$ ;  $F_k = \sum_{s=0}^k (F_s^1 F_{k-s}^2 + T_s^1 T_{k-s}^2)$ 
    for  $i = 1, \dots, n$ 
      if  $x_i$  does not appear in  $\mathcal{F}$  then  $A_{k,i} = 0$ ,  $B_{k,i} = 0$ 
      if  $x_i$  appears in  $\mathcal{F}_1$  then
         $A_{k,i} = \sum_{s=0}^k (B_{s,i}^1 T_{k-s}^2 + A_{s,i}^1 F_{k-s}^2)$ ;  $B_{k,i} = \sum_{s=0}^k (B_{s,i}^1 F_{k-s}^2 + A_{s,i}^1 T_{k-s}^2)$ ;
      if  $x_i$  appears in  $\mathcal{F}_2$  then
         $A_{k,i} = \sum_{s=0}^k (B_{s,i}^2 T_{k-s}^1 + A_{s,i}^2 F_{k-s}^1)$ ;  $B_{k,i} = \sum_{s=0}^k (B_{s,i}^2 F_{k-s}^1 + A_{s,i}^2 T_{k-s}^1)$ ;
return  $[\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B}, \mathbf{T}, \mathbf{F}]$ ;

```